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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY KIRK CREAlviER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7664 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
CO:\IES now HARRY KIRK CREAMER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent herein, and respectfully petitions this 
Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled 
case, and to vacate the Order of this Court herein revers-
ing the judgment for respondent with instructions to dis-
miss. 
This Petition is based on the following grounds: 
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Point I. 
This Court has, by its opinion herein, deprived the 
plaintiff of a jury trial and has decided this case con-
trary to the opinions and controlling cases decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
Point II. 
This Court has erred in deciding as a matter of law 
that defendant was not negligent in furnishing "insuffi-
cient" equipment for the work of icing diners, and only 
owes a duty to workmen having "no physical weakness." 
Accompanying this Petition and filed herewith is a 
brief in support thereof. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
_______________ \,ja_'J-r.ll:.---~+~-\.a.~t( _________________ _ 
Wayne L. Black 
Attorneys for PlaVn.tiff and 
Respondent 
I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for 
the Respondent, Petitioner herein, and that in my opinion 
there is good cause to believe the judgment objected to is 
erroneous and that the case ought to be re-examined as 
prayed for in said Petition. 
Dated this---~~---- day of June, 1952. 
____________ w_a."f_t\-e. ___ ~_(_G_la~----------------
w ayne L. Black 
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RECEIYED ~ cop~f the foregoing Petition and 
Brief in Support Thereof this ... L~ ...... day of June, 1952. 
Bryan P. Leverich 
M. J. Bronson 
A. U. Miner 
Howard F. Coray 
D. A. Alsup 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Point I. 
THIS COURT HAS, BY ITS OPINION HEREIN, DE-
PRIVED THE PLAINTIFF OF A JURY TRIAL AND HAS 
DECIDED THIS CASE CONTRARY TO THE OPINIONS AND 
CONTROLLING CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Plaintiff, employed by defendant as a coach cleaner, 
after a number of months of assignment to lighter tasks, 
was ordered and directed to ice three diners. Over a 
period of 2lf2 hours he carried 1lf2 tons of ice, 100 pounds 
at a time, up a 15 foot ladder. The extreme overexertion 
occasioned by this task caused him to suffer heart failure 
and consequent permanent injury. Icing diners was the 
most strenuous task in The 0. U. R. & D. yard. Some of 
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the coach cleaners didn't have sufficient strength and 
stamina to ice three diners. Coach cleaners coming from 
a vacation or whose muscles were not hardened to the 
task, experienced real difficulty icing diners until they 
became conditioned to its strenuous demands. Yet, of the 
many coach cleaners working in the yard, any or all were 
called upon from time to time to perform this task. The 
likelihood of injury from overexertion to one or more of 
this class of workmen could certainly be foreseen by a 
reasonably prudent employer, viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to plaintiff. 
The evidence further revealed that practical lifting 
and hoisting devices were readily available and even in 
use on adjacent tracks by the Pacific Fruit Express 
Company. 
The trial judge determined that the evidence was 
sufficient to require submission to the jury of the ques-
tions of defendant's negligence and proximate cause. The 
jury found that defendant \vas negligent and that said 
negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
The case was submitted to the jury on instructions un-
assailed here. 
This Court has held that reasonable minds could not 
differ upon the proposition that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of plain-
tiff. By this holding, the Court has deprived plaintiff of 
a jury trial upon the issues of this case. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Tiller 
v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 
63 S. Ct. 444, ±51, has pointed out: 
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"It appears to be the clear Congressional in-
tent that to the maxilnum extent proper, questions 
in actions arising under the Act should be left to 
the jury." 
That. Court in a number of recent cases has carefully 
guarded the right of trial by jury in cases arising under 
the Federal En1ployers' Liability Act and has vigorously 
upheld and given effect to the intention of Congress as 
above set forth. We submit that the holding of 
this Court is in conflict with the holdings in these 
controlling cases and is contrary to the provisions of 
said Act. 
This Court has resolved facts and legitimate infer-
ences from facts against rather than in favor of the 
plaintiff. For example, the Court in its opinion stated: 
"It must be conceded that without the rheu-
matic heart, injury would not have resulted." 
We call attention to the fact that plaintiff had not 
been performing this type of vigorous exercise for a 
long period of time. He was assigned this task on a hot 
summer day. It involved lifting a tremendous amount of 
weight up a near vertical ladder. Some coach cleaners, 
because of natural physical weakness, could not have 
iced three diners, one following the other, even had they 
tried. We deny that it must be conceded plaintiff would 
not have suffered injury without the rheumatic heart. 
We submit that from the legitimate inferences from 
known facts the jury could well have found and did find 
a likelihood of injury to any member of the class of work-
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men to which plaintiff belonged in the general nature of 
the task assigned. 
This Court has disregarded the admonitions of the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of Tennant v. 
Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 
412, 88 L. Ed. 520, where the court stated: 
"It is not the function of a court to search the 
record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in 
order to take the case away from the jury on a 
theory that the proof gives equal support to incon-
sistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point 
of judicial review is the reasonableness of the 
particular inference or conclusion, drawn by the 
jury. It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-
finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence 
and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, 
receives expert instructions, and draws the ulti-
mate conclusion as to the facts. The very es-
sence of its function is to select from among con-
flicting inferences and conclusions that which it 
considers most reasonable. * * * That conclusion, 
whether it relates to negligence, causation or any 
other factual matter, cannot be ignored. Courts 
are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside 
the jury verdict 1nerely because the jury could 
have drawn different inferences or conclusions 
or because judges feel that other results are more 
reasonable. 
''Upon an examination of the record we can-
not say that the inference drawn by this jury that 
respondent's negligence caused the fatal accident 
is without support in the evidence. Thus to enter 
a judg1nent for respondent notwithstanding the 
verdict is to deprive petitioner of the right to a 
jury trial. No reason is apparent why we should 
abdicate our duty to protect and guard that right 
in this case." 
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In the TilleT case, supra, the court stated (63 S. Ct. 
44-!, 451) : 
·· * * * :Many years ago this Court said of the 
problen1s of negligence, '\Ye see no reason, so long 
as the jury systen1 is the law of the land, and the 
jury is n1ade the tribunal to decide disputed 
questions of fact, why it should not decide such 
questions as these as well as others.' Jones v. 
East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 
9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 478, 479. Or as we have 
put it on another occasion, 'Where the facts are 
in dispute, and the evidence in relation to them 
is that from which fair-minded men may draw dif-
ferent inferences,' the case should go to the jury." 
In Bailey v. Central r ermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 
63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 1444, the court stated: 
"The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and 
fundamental feature of our system of federal jur-
isprudence.' ~Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 
752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166. It is part and 
parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers 
under the Employers' Liability Act. Reasonable 
care and cause and effect are as elusive here as in 
other fields. But the jury has been chosen as the 
appropriate tribunal to apply those standards to 
the facts of these personal injuries. That method 
of determining the liability of the carriers and of 
placing on them the cost of these industrial acci-
dents may be crude, archaic, and expensive as com-
pared with the more modern systems of workmen's 
compensation. But however inefficient and back-
ward it may be, it is the system which Congress 
has provided. To deprive these workers of the 
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benefit of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases is 
to take away a goodly portion of the relief which 
Congress has afforded them." 
A recent case of the Eighth Circuit Court concisely 
states the gist of these Supreme Court decisions. Termi-
nal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Schorb, 151 F. 2d 361: 
"'" * * One of the main purposes of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act was to modify the 
common law barriers against recovery by an em-
ployee in a suit against his employer predicated 
on an industrial accident. Tiller, Executor, v. 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 
444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967. The right to 
jury trial constitutes a part of the remedy afford-
ed by the act and employees must not be deprived 
of that right in close or doubtful cases. Bailey, 
Administratrix, v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 
U.S. 350 loc. cit. 354, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444. 
It was for the jury, as the fact finding body, to 
weigh the evidence and judge credibility. Tennant, 
Administratrix, v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 
U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Crain v. Illi-
nois Central R. Co., 335 Mo. 658, 73 S..W. (2d) 786, 
certiorari denied, 293 U.S. 607, 55 S. Ct. 123, 79 
L. Ed. 698. On this appeal we must view the evi-
dence and inferences reasonably to be drawn 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to plaintiff. 
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., v. Muldowney, 
8 Cir., 130 F. (2d) 971, certiorari denied, 317 U.S. 
700, 63 S. Ct. 526, 87 L. Ed. 560." 
In Wilkerson v. McCarthy et al., 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. 
Ct. 413, 421, 93 L. Ed. 1098, reversing the Utah Supreme 
Court, 112 Utah 300, 187 P. 2d 188, Mr. Justice Douglas, 
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discussing the stewardship of F·. E. L.A. cases by the 
United States Supren1e Court, stated: 
'"The basis of liability under the Act is and 
remains negligence. Judges will not always agree 
as to what facts are necessary to establish negli-
gence. \Ye are not in agreement in all cases. But 
the review of the cases coming to the Court from 
the 1943 Tenn to date and set forth in the Appen-
dix to this opinion shows, I think, a record more 
faithful to the design of the Act than previously 
prevailed. 
"Of the 55 petitions for certiorari filed during 
this period, 20 have been granted. Of these one 
was granted at the instance of the employer, 19 at 
the instance of an employee. In 16 of these cases 
the lower court was reversed for setting aside a 
jury verdict for an employee or taking the case 
from the jury. In 3 the lo .... ver court was sustained 
in taking the case from the jury. In the one case 
granted at the instance of the employer we held 
that it had received the jury trial on contributory 
negligence to which it was entitled. In these 20 
cases we were unanimous in 10 of the decisions 
which we rendered on the merits. 
"Of the 35 petitions denied, 21 were by em-
ployers claiming that jury verdicts were erron-
eous or that new trials should not have been or-
dered. The remaining 14 were filed by employees. 
In 10 of these the lower court had withheld the 
case from the jury and rendered judgment for the 
employer, in 3 it had sustained jury verdicts for 
the employer and in 1 reversed a jury verdict for 
the employee and directed a new trial. 
"From this group of cases three observations 
can be n1ade : 
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" ( 1) The basis of liability has not been 
shifted from negligence to absolute liability. 
"(2) The criterion governing the exercise of 
our discretion in granting or denying certiorari is 
not who loses below but whether the jury function 
in passing on disputed questions of fact and in 
drawing inferences from proven facts has been 
respected. 
"(3) The historic role of the jury in per-
forming that function, see Jones v. East Tennes-
see, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 118, 
32 L. Ed. 478; Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 
135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 1050, 34 L. 
Ed. 235; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., supra, 
is being restored in this important class of cases." 
We submit that in the case at bar this Court has ab-
dicated its duty to guard and protect the right of plaintiff. 
to a jury trial. The approach by the Court to this case 
is contrary to the spirit of the foregoing cases. The evi-
dence has been viewed in a light more favorable to the de-
fendant than is justified. Inferences, some not founded 
on evidence, have been drawn in favor of defendant's 
case and against the jury's verdict. We will attempt to 
point these out with particularity in the following point: 
Point II. 
THIS COURT HAS ERRED IN DECIDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
FURNISHING "INSUFFICIENT" EQUIPMENT FOR THE 
WORK OF ICING DINERS, AND ONLY OWES A DUTY TO 
WORKMEN HAVING "NO PHYSICAL WEAKNESS." 
Applying the rules set forth in Point I herein, and 
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viewing the evidence and the inferences deducible there-
from in a light most favorable to plaintiff, let us con-
sider this Court's opinion. 
This Court has decided as matter of law that defend-
ant has violated "no legal duty." It has neither admitted 
nor denied existence of a duty owed by defendant of fur-
nishing coach cleaners with equipment and machinery 
sufficient for icing diners with safety, but the effect of 
its opinion is a holding that defendant owes no such duty. 
Consider for a moment the remarkable precariousness of 
this position. If no such duty exists, what is the mean-
ing of the word "sufficient~" How can it be defined in 
such a manner as to eliminate defendant's duty to plain-
tiff and its other employees~ Perhaps we should again 
consider the purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act as defined in the Wilkerson case, supra; at p. 420: 
"* * * The purpose of the Act was to change 
that strict rule of liability, to lift from employees 
the 'prodigious burden' of personal injuries which 
that system had placed upon them, and to relieve 
men 'who by the exigencies and necessities of life 
are bound to labor' from the risks and hazards 
that could be avoided or lessened 'by the exercise 
of proper care on the part of the e1nployer in pro-
viding safe and proper machinery and equipment 
with which the employee does his work.' 
"That purpose was not given a friendly re-
ception in the courts. In the first place, a great 
maze of restrictive interpretations were engrafted 
on the Act, constructions that deprived the bene-
ficiaries of many of the intended benefits of the 
legislation. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 
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233 U.S. 492, 34 S. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L.R.A. 
1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 4 75; Toledo, St. L. & 
W. R. Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165, 48 S. Ct. 215, 72 
L. Ed. 513 ; and the review of the cases in Tiller 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 62-67, 
63 S. Ct. 444, 448-451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 
967. In the second place, doubtful questions of 
fact were taken from the jury and resolved by the 
courts in favor of the employer. This Court led 
the way in overturning jury verdicts rendered for 
employees. S.ee Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. 
Coogan, 271 U.S. 472,46 S. Ct. 564,70 L. Ed.1041; 
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Aeby, 275 U.S. 426, 48 S. 
Ct. 177, 72 L. Ed. 351; New York Central R. Co. 
v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486, 50S. Ct. 198, 74 L. Ed. 
562. And so it was that a goodly portion of the 
relief which Congress had provided employees 
was withheld from them. 
"The first of these obstacles which the courts 
had created could be removed by Congress. In 
1939 Congress did indeed move to release the em-
ployees from the burden of assumption of risk 
which the Court had rein1posed on them. 53 Stat. 
1404, 45 U.S. C. Sec. 54, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54; Tiller 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra. The second 
evil was not so readily susceptible of Congression-
al correction under a system where liability is bot-
tomed on negligence. Since the condition was one 
created by the Court and beyond effective control 
by Congress, it was appropriate and fitting that 
the Court correct it. In fact, a decision not to 
correct it was to let the administration of this law 
be governed not by the aim of the legislation to 
safeguard employees but by a hostile philosophy 
that permeated its interpretation." 
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'Ye submit that the duty owed by defendant was a 
broad duty in keeping with the purposes of the act as out-
lined in the TVilke rson case, supra, and was owed not 
only to workmen who had "no physical weakness," but 
was owed to each and eyery member of the class of work-
men perfonning the task of icing diners. It was owed to 
the strong, the weak, the old and the young alike. This 
was a duty owed to a class of workmen as such. It's vio-
lation would depend on whether the class as a whole, 
and not just a part of the class, is protected, on whether 
there was a foreseeable likelihood of injury to any mem-
ber of the class, not just to plaintiff, and not just to 
"normal" or "ordinary" members of the class. 
If the foregoing propositions be not true, a large seg-
ment of workmen who fall below the normalcy class are 
precluded from the protection of the law. 
Defendant has claimed there was no breach of duty 
because plaintiff had an undiscoverable physical eccen-
tricity, but has failed to point out wherein plaintiff's 
physical condition has a bearing on defendant's duty and 
breach of duty. If defendant owed a duty to furnish suf-
ficient equipment for safety in icing diners and did not 
furnish such equipment, how can we escape the conclusion 
that defendant was negligent~ Under what stretch of the 
imagination does plaintiff's physical condition have a 
bearing on safety or unsafety to coach cleaners from in-
sufficient equipment f 
This Court has held as a matter of law that there 
was no likelihood of injury frorn overexertion to any 
substantial number of coach cleaners assigned the task 
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of icing diners by hand rather than by use of machinery, 
and has thereby again fallen into the error of judicially 
deciding a purely fact question. 
This Court's resolving of a fact issue as a matter 
of law brings to mind similar decisions of this Court in 
previous cases brought under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act and the Federal Safety Appliance Act. We 
invite a comparison with the first opinion in Pauly v. 
McCarthy et al., 109 Utah 398, 166 P. 2d 501, 508, where-
in the Court held that the passing track at Chacra was 
not a place to work. This Court will recall the evidence 
that trains with hotboxes proceeded onto the passing 
track at Chacra not only to allow other trains to pass 
along the main line track, but to make temporary repairs. 
The evidence was that plaintiff in dismounting from the 
rear car of his train at night, stepped off a trestle to the 
creek bed below and was injured. This Court held, and 
we quote: 
"We conclude that under the evidence the 
passing tracks at Chacra were not contemplated 
as a place for work but must be considered as 
one with all the rest of the road in the matter of 
making emergency adjustments or repairs; that 
using the passing tracks for such repairs was for 
convenience only in not holding up traffic and not 
because by custom, designation or contemplation 
a place of work; that for reasons more fully set 
out hereunder, under the evidence this was not 
a jury question." 
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Yet, the Supren1e Court of the United States at 67 S. Ct. 
962 reversed, holding that whether or not the passing 
track at Chacra was a place of work was at least a jury 
question. 
:Jir. Justice 'y olfe, in his dissent in the case of 
Coray u. Sonthern Pac. Co., 112 Utah 166, 185 P. 2d 963, 
970, had this to say about the reversal of the Pauly case 
by the United States Supreme Court: 
"'Ve thought that to hold the entire shoulder 
of the railroad as a place to work regardless of 
any functions, frequent or otherwise, to be per-
formed there, might require railroads to spend 
millions of dollars in widening the shoulders on 
every cut and fill so that an employee might safely 
drop off without first looking. F:or if there was 
a duty to build a flooring over a bridge at a pass-
ing track where an employee might by chance be 
required to make repairs in order to prevent an 
employee not exercising proper care from going 
down through the bridge, there would be a similar 
duty to widen every fill so as to prevent an em-
ployee, carelessly alighting, from sliding down the 
side of a fill where the sides were steep. 
"vVhile we have not had the benefit of an 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court as to 
the reasons for its decision, we may assume that it 
concluded from the evidence that in law the pass-
ing track was a place to work, or at least that, 
under the evidence, the passing track was a place 
to work was for the jury." 
In the case at bar reasons other than those relating 
to a determination of negligence have again been used 
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by this Court. It makes the astounding argument that 
if it were necessary for the defendant to use sufficient 
equipment it might eliminate manual labor on this job 
and deprive families of a livelihood. This should have 
nothing to do with a determination of plaintiff's right 
of recovery. 
This reasoning of the Court is absolutely contrary 
to the established interpretation of the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. In Boston & M. R. R. v. Meech, 156 F. 
2d 109, 111, the Court held that where further precautions 
could be taken for the safety of employees an evidentiary 
basis of negligence was established. The Court stated: 
"From the foregoing, it is clear that although 
some precautions were taken for the decedent's 
safety, further precautions were possible, and 
from this it follows, as we read the decisions cited 
above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' for 
submitting the issue of the defendant's causal 
negligence to the jury, and hence that our 'func-
tion is exhausted.'" 
Also see Boston & M. R. R. v. Kyle, 156 F. 2d 112. 
Where a safer method of procedure could have been fol-
lowed in doing the work, the Court held there was an evi-
dentiary basis for a finding of negligence. 
This Court took a fact question from the jury in the 
case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy et al., 112 Utah 300, 187 P. 
2d 188, 194. In that case the question arose as to whether 
by custom and usage a plank across a wheel pit, sur-
rounded on three sides by chains, was a walkway. In 
spite of evidence that for three months prior to the acci-
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dent switch1nen had used the plank as a walkway, swing-
ing around the posts and inside the enclosure of the 
chains, this Court weighed disputed questions of fact and 
held, and we quote: 
•· An exa1nination of this evidence shows the 
witness could identify two switchmen who crossed 
the plank during the three nwnths period, but it is 
entirely lacking in those elements necessary to 
show acceptance of a custmn or practice by acqui-
escence. The use by employees other than the two 
is confused between the times before and the times 
after the installation of the safety chains." 
And again, at p. 195 : 
"It must be conceded that if dependents knew 
or were charged with knowledge that switchmen 
and other workmen generally in the yard were 
habitually using the plank as a walkway in the 
manner claimed by plaintiff, then the safety en-
closure might be entirely inadequate, and a jury 
question would have been presented on the condi-
tion of the board and the adequacy of the enclo-
sure." 
The Supreme Court of the United States again was 
forced to remind this Court that disputed questions of 
fact and inferences therefrom are peculiarly questions 
for the jury, and after quoting the last aforementioned 
portion of this Court's opinion, stated (69 S. Ct. 413, 
-!17) : 
"We agree with this last quoted statement of 
the Utah court, and since there was evidence to 
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support a jury finding that employees generally 
had habitually used the board as a walkway, it was 
error for the trial judge to direct a verdict in 
favor of respondent." 
In the case at bar this Court has held that there is no 
disputed question of fact concerning the likelihood of 
injury from over straining in icing diners. This decision 
assurnes the very fact which was in dispute in the case 
and about which there was controversial evidence. It 
assumes as an absolute proposition of fact that the rail-
road could not have reasonably anticipated or foreseen 
the likelihood of injury to any of its employees from the 
nature of the task of icing diners and the severity of the 
strain involved in performing that task, that the task 
was not difficult to perform and did not involve the like-
lihood of overexertion. This Court is again in the identi-
cal position it occupied in deciding disputed questions of 
fact as matter of law in the Pauly and Wilkerson cases. 
This Court has set up as the sole standard of care 
to which the railroad company must comply safeguarding 
against foreseeable injury to "ordinary" employees. As 
we have heretofore pointed out, the "ordinary" individual 
thusly defined would be more accurately described as 
the perfect individual, that is, the strong, husky youth 
with no physical deficiency or inadequacies whatsoever. 
This Court is blinded to the realism of fact that all em-
ployees are not perfect or even "ordinary." Some may 
be 5 feet 7 inchs in height and weighing 127 pounds, as 
was one of the witnesses. Some may have suffered from 
the ravages of age and hardening of the arteries. Some 
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may haYe congenital weakne~~e::;; which may ultimately 
produce hernia~ fr01n oyerstrain. Yet these individuals, 
'vhen subjected to the usual and ordinary type of stress 
and strain in the perfor1nance of their labor, would suffer 
no injury, but if confronted with the strenuous and bur-
densonle task of icing three diners, carrying llj2 tons of 
ice up a 15 foot ladded over a period of 2¥2 hours, may 
suffer injury, and the jury could have found and did 
find that plaintiff was among the class of individuals 
wherein there was and would be a likelihood of some in-
jury in the assigning of hin1 to this task, especially in 
view of the fact that he was not hardened to the task but 
had been perfonning lighter work for some period of time 
prior to his injuries. Consider in this connection the 
statement made by ?\Ir. Justice Wade in his concurring 
opinion in Bennett 1.:. Pilot Products Co., Inc., 235 P. 2d 
525, 528: 
··It see1ns clear, however, that if respondent 
had reason to believe that one out of every thou-
sand of its owners would be harmed as plaintiff 
was by the use of its products, then it could fore-
see, and therefore must reasonably anticipate that 
such would be the result. :Many negligently main-
tained dangerous instrumentalities actually harm 
less than one person in a thousand of those who 
come in contact with the1n. To hold that such re-
sult could not be reasonably anticipated is to give 
to such expression a meaning not ordinarily in-
tended and will lead to confusion rather than clear 
thinking." 
Although \Ve realize the court has held otherwise, 
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let us assume for the purpose of argument that a duty 
was owed by defendant to furnish sufficient equipment 
for the task of icing diners and that said duty was vio-
lated in not furnishing sufficient equipment. The only 
remaining question is that of proximate cause. This 
Court has likewise held as matter of law that strenuous 
overexertion was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. It has so held in spite of positive medical testi-
mony that overstraining was the precipitating, contribut-
ing cause of his injuries. Let us consider this holding 
in the light of the Act which reads in part as follows ( 45 
U.S.C.A., Sec. 51) : 
"Every common carrier * * * shall be liable 
in damages * * * for * * * injuries * * * resulting 
in whole or in part from * * * insufficiency, due to 
its negligence, in its * * * machinery, * * * or other 
equipment." 
Common law principles of proximate cause are modi-
fied and altered by abolition of contributory negligence 
as a bar to recovery, and by substitution of the concept 
of multiplicity of causes. 
This Court has suggested that plaintiff would not 
have been injured were it not for his rheumatic heart. 
It has held as a matter of law that the rheumatic heart 
was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
We wonder what characterization this Court would 
attach to the overexertion to which plaintiff was sub-
jected. Is this merely "a non-negligent condition" as was 
· suggested by this Court in its erroneous opinion in the 
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ca:se of Coray v. Sollfhcru Pucit'ic Co. 11:2 Utah 166 185 
. ' ' 
P. :2d 963, or is thi~ disting-uishable as a cause "in a phil-
osophical sense'' rather than .. in a leg-al sense" as was 
sug-g-ested by this Court in the same case~ 
\Ye call attention to the languag-e of the United 
State:s Suprenw Court in the case of Coray v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 275, 277, 93 L. Ed. 208, 
where the Court stated : 
'"The languag-e selected by Cong-ress to fix 
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. 
Consideration of its meaning by the introduction 
of dialetical subtleties can serve no useful inter-
pretative purpose. The statute declares that rail-
roads shall be responsible for their ernployees' 
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from de-
fective appliances such as were here maintained. 
-!5 L".S.C. Sec. 51, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. And to 
make its purpose crystal clear, Congress has also 
provided that 'no such employee * * * shall be held 
to have been guilty of contributory neg-lig-ence in 
any case' where a violation of the Safety Appli-
ance Act, such as the one here, 'contributed to the 
* * * death of such employee.' 45 U.S.C. Sec. 53, 
45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 53. Congress has thus for its 
own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obliga-
tions upon railroads and has commanded that if 
a breach of these obligations contributes in part 
to an employee's death, the railroad must pay 
damages. These air-brakes were defective; for 
this reason alone the train suddenly and unex-
pectedly stopped; a motor track car following at 
about the same rate of speed and operated by an 
employee looking in another direction crashed into 
the train; all of these circumstances were insepar-
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ably related to one another in time and space. 
The jury could have found that decedent's death 
resulted from any or all of the foregoing circum-
stances." 
In a case where a multiplicity of causes and condi-
tions contributed to cause plaintiff's injuries, this Court 
has singled out plaintiff's physical condition and labeled 
it sole proximate cause. It has thereby in effect judicially 
legislated the words "in whole or in part" out of the 
act. 
If this Court's opinion is allowed to stand and be-
cmne a precedent in this state it will mean that any rail-
road workman suffering from a straining injury will be 
defeated simply because he had an "undiscoverable physi-
cal eccentricity," without which he would not have suf-
fered injury. The reasoning of this Court's opinion would. 
clearly have defeated plaintiff in Stewart v. Baltimore & 
0. R. Co., 137 F'. 2d 527, 529, where decedent had an un-
discoverable physical weakness, to wit: a coronary heart, 
injured frmn overstraining, but the Court rightly held 
"Over-exertion resulting in serious casualties is some-
thing which can as well be foreseen as many other occur-
rences and is something which an employer may be 
thought bound to take all reasonable steps to prevent." 
Such reasoning would have defeated plaintiff in Louis-
ville, etc. R. Co. v. Kerrick, 178 Ky. 486, 199 S.W. 44, 
where plaintiff incurred a hernia from straining. Like-
wise it would have defeated plaintiff in the case of Duffy 
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 218 P. 2d 1080. 
Countless cases and countless courts have allowed 
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plaintiffs under the Federal En1ployers' Liability Act to 
rE'('over for straining injurie8. Ruptured intervertebral 
disks, spondylolisthesis, inguinal hernia, incisional her-
nia, ruptured blood ve8sel and coronary thrornbosis cases 
are being tried daily in our courts. Almost without ex-
ception these are ra8es of latent undiscoverable weak-
nesses without which injuries would not have occurred, 
and where the injury is caused in whole or in part from 
overexertion either as a result of insufficient equipment 
or as a result of insufficient help, or both. Many of these 
cases are cited in plaintiff's original brief. 
~\nalogous cases where recovery has not been allowed 
are distinguishable. Among others, this Court has cited 
Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., 103 N.Y.S. 2d 137, 
and Louis'Uille & N. R. Co. v. Willhite, 300 Ky. 75, 187 
S.\Y. 2d 1010 . 
.. As we pointed out in our original brief, these are 
cases decided pursuant to the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. Under this doctrine a man assumes the natural, 
ordinary anticipated risks of his employment. Risks of 
overexertion from insufficiency of equipment were the 
very kind of risks assumed. There was no recovery at 
common law for in~ufficiency of equipment. This is a 
duty imposed by statute, and safeguarded by statutory 
abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk. We again 
cite 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 54: 
"That in any action brought against any com-
Inon carrier under or by virtue of any of the pro-
visions of this chapter to recover damages for in-
juries to, or the death of, any of its employees, 
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such employee shall not be held to have assumed 
the risks of his employment in any case where such 
injury or death resulted in whole or in part from 
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
employees of such carrier; * * * ." 
Likewise, the Tiller case, supra, ( 63 S. Ct. 444, 451) 
where it was said: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk cannot 
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain in partial 
existence as the court below suggests. The theory 
that a servant is completely barred from recovery 
for injury resulting from his master's negligence, 
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in all 
its various forms of contributory negligence, the 
fellow ser;vant rule, and assumption of risk, must 
not, contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed 
recrudescence under any other label in the com-
mon law lexicon* * *." 
This Courts calls it by another name, non-negligence, but 
the doctrine of assumption of risk cannot thus easily 
be disguised. It has been resurrected from the scrap heap 
of the law to again defeat a plaintiff's cause. 
In conclusion may we urge the following proposi-
tions: 
1. This Court has erroneously concluded that there 
was no likelihood of injury to railroad coach cleaners 
from overexertion even though the evidence and infer-
ences favorable to plaintiff lead to a contrary conclu-
sion, and even though the jury and trial judge came to a 
contrary conclusion. 
2. This Court has erroneously concluded that the 
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words "in whole or in part'' have no 1neaning in the 
statute, are mere verbiage, and has judicially excluded 
workmen with so-called physical eccentricities, who break 
down under strain and overexertion, from the benefits 
of the act. 
3. This Court has erroneously disregarded the stat-
utory and t:"nited States Supreme Court decisional law 
in holding that plaintiff assumed the risks of overexertion 
incident to his employment and has labeled assumption 
of risk as non-negligence. 
X ever before has this Court, even in the Pauly, 
Wilkerson and Coray cases, supra, so clearly disregarded 
the meaning and philosophy of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein set forth, we submit that 
error was committed by the Court in reversing and dis-
missing the cause of plaintiff and in setting aside a jury 
verdict in his favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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